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ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS SO INCONCLUSIVE THAT 
IT WAS BASED ON REMOTE AND SPECULATIVE POSSIBILITIES 
OF GUILT, REASONABLE MINDS MUST HAVE ENTERTAINED A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE CRIME. 
An appellate court will reverse on the basis of insufficiency of 
the evidence "when the evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable that ^reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt' that the defendant committed the crime." State v. Goddard, 
871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (quotation omitted); accord State v. 
Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1151 (Utah 1991); State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 
810, 819 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In reviewing an issue concerning 
insufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court's function is to 
insure that there is "sufficient competent evidence" regarding each 
element of the charge to support a finding that the defendant, beyond 
a reasonable doubt,1 committed the crime. See Warden, 813 P.2d at 
1150. 
x5eeUtah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1), providing that "[a] defendant 
in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each 
element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, the defendant shall 
be acquitted." 
3 
In its Brief, the State argues that Defendant failed to meet the 
marshaling requirement by omitting stipulations of the parties that 
were entered into both prior to and during trial (See Brief of 
Appellee, p. 8) . When viewed more closely, however, the stipulations 
referred to by the State are basically of a foundational nature and 
are substantially repetitive of the list of evidence marshaled by 
Defendant on pages fifteen and sixteen of his Brief. 
One particular stipulation emphasized by the State in the course 
of the foregoing argument is the parties' stipulation that neither 
Defendant Murphy nor Defendant "had permission to be in Mason Moving 
and Storage on the evening of the 22nd of June." (See R. 85-86, Bench 
Trial Transcript). The State argues that this stipulation, together 
with other surrounding circumstances set forth on pages eleven and 
twelve of Appellee's Brief, "clearly establish that at least one 
person in Murphy's vehicle unlawfully entered Mesa's building that 
night." Such an argument indicates at least some recognition by the 
State that while the evidence at trial and the reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom show, albeit inconclusively, that there was a 
burglary and theft, it fails to conclusively prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant burglarized the building and 
exercised unauthorized control over the vending machine and coin 
changer. By focusing on the superfluous and tangential stipulation 
about whether or not Murphy and Defendant had permission to be in the 
building, the State attempts to divert attention from the real issue 
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of whether there was sufficient competent evidence on each element to 
support Defendant's conviction. 
The State gives short shrift to the fact that there is no 
physical evidence, whatsoever, connecting Defendant, to the alleged 
burglary or theft. At trial, the investigating officer, Officer 
Arnold, testified that he found no fingerprints upon checking both 
the inside and outside of the door frame or door that allegedly had 
been pried open in the course of the burglary (Bench Trial 
Transcript, R. 83, lines 7-14) . Moreover, Officer Arnold did not 
check either the vending machine or the coin changer for fingerprints 
(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 83, lines 17-21) . In light of this 
complete lack of physical evidence, the failure of any witness to 
place Defendant in any location other than as a passenger in Murphy' s 
automobile, and the uncontroverted testimony by Murphy that Defendant 
neither assisted (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 96-97; R. 110, lines 8-
10) nor knew anything of the crime (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 94-95) 
until Murphy explained it to him in the course of the chase from 
North Salt Lake to Salt Lake City proper (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 
97, lines 14-16, 23-25) , should cause this Court to reach a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431-32 (Utah 1989). 
The State argues in its Brief that "Defendant's unlawful 
presence in the building is reasonably drawn from the testimony 
concerning whether the vending and change machines . . . could be 
carried by one person." {See Brief of Appellee, p. 12) . The 
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testimony at trial indicates otherwise. Officer Beckstrand's 
uncontroverted testimony at trial was that the vending machine and 
coin changer could be lifted by oneself (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 
70-73; R. 75, lines 7-14) . Even the owner of the units, who, unlike 
Mr. Murphy, is not an experienced mover, testified that, while being 
very awkward and difficult, it is possible to move the "units" by 
yourself (Bench Trial Transcript, R. 89, lines 6-12) . The inference 
that Mr. Murphy could and did lift the units by himself and put them 
in the back of his car is especially reasonable in light of the 
undisputed evidence that Mr. Murphy, at the time of trial, had worked 
loading and unloading moving trucks for approximately eleven years 
(Bench Trial Transcript, R. 93, lines 11-14). 
Defendant acknowledges that the trial court did not believe co-
defendant Murphy's version of the events. Further, Defendant 
acknowledges that issues of credibility are left to the trier of 
fact. Cf. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) . However, 
credibility issues aside, the evidence in the instant case is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that the trier of 
fact must have entertained a reasonable doubt about Defendant's 
guilt.2 
2The State assails Defendant's citation of State v. Workman, 852 
P.2d 981 (Utah 1993), on the grounds that it does not represent a 
plurality opinion by the Utah Supreme Court. By so arguing, the 
State fails to recognize that the proposition for which Workman is 
cited, i.e., that "a guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is 
based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or 
speculative possibilities of guilt", is inherently consistent with 
the principles set forth in State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 
1991) (quoting State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1991)). 
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Finally, the State cites State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 
(Utah 1985), for the proposition that the requisite intent to commit 
burglary in the instant case can be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence of the manner of entry, the time of day, the character and 
contents of the building, the person's actions after entry, the 
totality of the surrounding circumstances, and the intruder's 
explanation. According to the Utah Supreme Court's qualifying 
language set forth in Porter, such an inference can be made "[w]here 
the breaking and entering are clearly established and not 
controverted . . . ." Id. (Emphasis added) . Unlike the defendant in 
Porter, who was seen by the apartment manager breaking into an 
apartment across the hall and who was found by the police in the 
course of committing the burglary, see id. at 1176, there were no 
witnesses in the instant case who placed Defendant in any location 
other than the passenger seat of Murphy's car. In sum, the breaking 
and entering at issue in the instant case were not clearly 
established and uncontroverted and therefore intent cannot be 
inferred. Furthermore, even if the breaking and entering were 
clearly established and uncontroverted, the manner of entry, the time 
of day, the character and contents of the building, the person's 
Furthermore, the concurring opinion authored by Justice Howe, in 
which Justices Hall, C.J., and Zimmerman join, does not specifically 
disagree with the aforementioned proposition for which Workman is 
cited but instead criticizes an unrelated analysis particular to the 
photograph at issue therein. 
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actions after entry,3 the totality of the surrounding circumstances, 
and the intruder's explanation all weight heavily in favor of the 
evidentiary failure to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant 
had the requisite intent as a principal or as a party to commit the 
alleged burglary. 
Even when the evidence supporting the conviction of burglary and 
theft is viewed is a light most favorable to the trial court's 
verdict, it is insufficient to support the conviction inasmuch as the 
totality of the circumstances and evidence lead one to formulate a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the trial 
court. Reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is therefore 
appropriate in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse his convictions of burglary and theft and remand for a 
new trial or further proceedings consistent with this Court's 
instructions as stated in its opinion. 
3The State cites State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983), 
for the proposition that flight after commission of a crime may be 
considered by the fact finder in deciding the question of guilt or 
innocence. However, the State fails to mention that while such a 
matter may be appropriately considered by the trier of fact, it 
should be cautioned and tempered by considerations "that there may be 
reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence and that even if 
consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not 
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged." Id. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant 
issues in the instant appeal dealing with sufficiency of evidence 
issues and the level of evidence required for burglary and theft 
convictions. Such matters are of continuing public interest and, in 
light of the facts presented by the instant appeal, involve issues 
requiring further development in the area of criminal law case 
development for the benefit of bar and public. Counsel for Defendant 
further requests that the method of disposition of the instant appeal 
be by opinion designated by the Court "For Official Publication" for 
purposes of precedential value and direction in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of October, 1997. 
,D & WIGGINS, P.C. 
fins 
Attorney&Hfer Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a) (11). 
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